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Risk, responsibilities and rights: reassessing the ‘economic causes of crime’ thesis in a recession 
Ross Fergusson 
Department of Social Policy and Criminology, Open University, UK 
Abstract 
 
This paper explores competing accounts of an apparent inversion of the previously-
prevailing relationship between young people's unemployment and the incidence of 
youth offending at a time of economic recession. It begins by highlighting the 
faltering association between unemployment and offending, and considers the 
paradoxical implications for risk-based methodologies in youth justice practice. The 
paper then assesses explanations for the changing relationship that suggest that 
youth justice policies have successfully broken the unemployment-offending link; and 
alternatively that delayed effects of recession have yet to materialise, by reference to 
the work of four Inter-governmental organisations and to youth protests outside the 
UK. In place of ever more intensive risk analyses, the paper focusses on the adverse 
effects of unemployment on social cohesion, and proposes a rights-based approach 
to youth justice that recognises the growing disjuncture between the rights afforded 
to young people and the responsibilities expected of them. 
 
Key words: unemployment-crime relationship, risk, rights, mutual obligations, 
social cohesion 
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Introduction 
 
The academic study of the relationship between unemployment and offending 
amongst young people is supported by both a feast and a famine of literature. There 
is an apparently limitless self-renewing supply of panel and cohort studies that map 
the patterns of statistical association between these two phenomena, at a great 
range of levels of aggregation, and other variables  across many countries. The 
economists, psychologists and others who pursue these analyses  (see for example 
Entorf and Spengler, 2000; Agell, 2003; Narayan and Smyth, 2004; Buonanno,2006; 
Farrington et al, 1986; Bynner et al, 2004; Bynner,2009;  Britt, 1997; Pouget, 2006; 
Baron, 2006,2008; Gronqvist, 2011; Phillips and Land, 2012) invariably identify a 
positive statistical relationship between unemployment and offending amongst young 
people, often over extended periods. For all the abundance of data they draw upon, 
these analyses offer no clear indications of direct causality in the links between 
unemployment and offending. In contrast, a very small number of researchers using 
predominantly qualitative methods intermittently tackle this vexed relationship. Some 
achieve only glancing analytical engagements with the elusive links (see 
Mizen,2006; Furlong and Cartmel, 2007). A very few others, in the form of local 
studies using relatively small samples, aim to understand the relationship between 
unemployment and offending in terms of context, meanings, causes and the choices 
made by young people (notably White,1989; MacDonald et al, 2001;Webster et al, 
2006,) but are limited by the difficulty of transferring and applying context-specific 
evidence and interpretations elsewhere. 
 
This paper provides a new analysis of the connections between young people's 
unemployment and offending in exceptional recessionary times, based on recent 
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data and interventions. In doing so, it charts the apparent dissipation of the dominant 
positive pattern of connection between the two in the contemporary UK, and 
considers whether the present pattern can be explained by recent risk-based 
policies. In the absence of clear evidence that this is so, the paper explores other 
interpretations of an apparently changing interface between unemployment and 
crime, setting them in the context of major cross-national increases in youth 
unemployment, and the serious  concerns of some major Inter-governmental 
Organisations about its impact on social cohesion. The paper concludes with some 
reflections on the 'responsibilities and rights' discourse at a time of major demand 
failure in youth labour markets. 
 
The fragmenting association of youth unemployment and crime 
 
The ‘economic causes of crime’ thesis (originally Barnes, 1895; more recently  
Reiner, 2007; Jones, 2007) anticipates that the archetypal linkage between a weak 
economy, rising youth unemployment and increased offending should never be more 
evident in the UK than at present. Remarkably, however, the current profile appears 
to be almost the inverse. At no time since the 1930s have economic recession and 
unemployment impacted so greatly on young people in the UK. As Figure One 
shows, the sharp and sudden upturn in youth unemployment rates at the onset of the 
2008/9 recession reversed a long-declining trend. Unemployment amongst young 
people reached its highest rate since records began, climbing to 1.2 million in 2011.  
Four of every ten 16 to 17-year-olds were classified as not economically active 
(which includes 15% of this age group who were not in education or training, as well 
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as being economically inactive). Almost one in five 16 -24-year-olds were 
economically inactive.  
 [Figure 1 here] 
At the same time, youth offending is in sharp and sustained decline. Contrary to 
historical patterns, trends in the numbers of young people aged 10-17 in the youth 
justice system show a sharp decline while trends in youth unemployment rise. As 
Figure Two shows, data from both the Police National Computer (PNC) and the 
Youth Justice Board (YJB) show that a downward trend that begun in 2007/8 
continued apparently unaffected by the sudden sharp rise in youth unemployment in 
2008, and continued after the 2009 recession was formally declared.  
 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
This data is even more clearly reflected in longer-term data for adults aged 18 and 
above. Recessionary conditions were becoming clear in the late 1980s, and 
recession began in 1991. The continuous line in Figure Three shows victim-reported 
crime levels from the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW – previously 
known as the British Crime Survey); the bar charts show police recorded crime 
(PRC). Both sets of data capture the steep rise in the number of offences after 1991, 
though they differ in the duration of the rising trends and the onset of the decline in 
offending. By comparison, the 2009 recession coincides with a decline in numbers of 
offences which begins in 2008, and then continues (according to PRC data) or flat-
lines (according to CSEW data) until 2012, coinciding with the run-up to the second 
‘dip’ of the recession. 
[Figure 3 here] 
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On the face of it, the worst recession in modern times has resulted in a marked 
decline in offending. And while attempts to demonstrate historically consistent 
indices of association between unemployment and crime have foundered 
(Britt,1997), this inversion is not only unprecedented and counterintuitive, it is a 
potential threat to the paradigm upon which 15 years of risk-based practise in youth 
justice has been founded – an observation to which we return later. Analysts now 
face the perverse proposition that recessionary conditions appear to suppress the 
incidence of offending.  
Unemployment and crime:  a brief history 
 
The historical relationship between unemployment and crime rates for all ages is 
complex and contested. Analyses using regression modelling to produce precise 
quantifications of the shifting pattern have a long, disputatious and fraught history in 
the literature (see for example  Becker, 1968; Scorcu and Cellini, 1998; Hale, 1999).  
Meta-studies have sought to weigh competing claims. Tarling's (1982) overview 
identified a majority of studies that found no evidence of a (significant) relationship 
between offending and unemployment. Box (1987) observed that 32 of 50 studies 
found a significant relationship between the two. Knepper (2007) argues that most 
analysts agree that crime rates reflect unemployment rates over the long term, but 
that these vary by type of crime. Bell and Blanchflower’s (2010)  review identifies 
numerous studies that find significant relationships between crime and 
unemployment. These two more recent meta-studies therefore suggest one way 
forward. 
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Differentiating types of crime 
 
Differentiating types of crime may help explain why some crime rates sometimes rise 
in times of high unemployment. Bell and Blanchflower (op.cit.) report that ‘as 
unemployment rates increase, crime rates tend to rise, especially property crime’ 
(see also for example Hansen and Machin, 2002 in support of the ‘economic causes 
of crime’ thesis). Wu and Wu’s (2012) study used estimates based on UK regional 
data for the effects on crime rates of variability in earnings inequality and 
unemployment between 2002 and 2007. They find that ‘crimes motivated by 
economic gain are highly correlated with income inequality and unemployment’ and 
that ‘there is a clear distinction between economic and non-economic crimes’ 
(p.3774). 
 
But taking into account different types of crime, the most recent analyses in the USA 
suggest that  the patchy match between rising unemployment and rising crime 
continues, with strong evidence that since the onset of  recession violent crime and 
property crime fell by about 5%, while robberies -  often most associated with 
recession – fell by 10% in a year from 2009. (The Economist, 9th July 2012). While 
some of the most recent data for England and Wales reflects these counter-typical 
trends, as Figure Four shows, the total aggregated flat-lining CSEW data masks 
some contrary data for crimes that are claimed to be those that are most causally 
associated with unemployment and financial duress. The incidence of opportunistic 
crimes like  ‘other household theft’ along with thefts of personal property rose 
markedly soon after 2009, and the long-standing continuous decline in burglary and 
vehicle-related theft ceased in the same year. 
[Figure 4 here] 
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It is clear that descriptive statistics alone show that differentiating types of crime 
moderates claims that the current trend breaks prevailing historical patterns of 
association between unemployment and offending. 
 
Who and what counts? 
 
In addition to differentiating types of crime, further refinements need to be 
considered. Firstly, one of the effects of welfare reform  and the shift to 
conditionalised unemployment benefits has been to alter significantly the respective 
proportions of working age people who are  registered as unemployed and who are 
assigned to welfare-to-work programmes. It is not only changes in the 
unemployment rate that might correspond to increases in property crime: more 
stringent benefit regimes may also have a more pronounced effect. Machin and 
Marie (2006) analysed these effects and concluded that ‘the benefit cuts and 
sanctions embodied in the stricter JSA regime shifted people off the benefit system 
and raised crime’. (p.163) . Confining analyses to crime rates thus gives only a 
partial picture. 
 
Secondly, there are fundamental methodological difficulties with studies which 
estimate the links between unemployment and crime using panel data. Aggregate 
data gathered for one purpose are placed alongside aggregate data gathered for 
another to examine the relationship between shifts in the rates of both over time. The 
data used show the incidences of both measures in particular periods at aggregate 
levels, not multiple identifiable individual cases (see Carmichael and Ward (2000) ; 
Wu and Wu, op.cit.).  
 8 
 
Overall, aggregate studies do nothing to show that unemployed people are more 
likely to offend, or that offenders are more likely to be unemployed. If the purpose of 
analysis is to understand causation and test economic causes of crime theories, 
isolating a wide range of influences on changing crime rates is essential. Levitt’s 
(2004) renowned studies suggested that the strong US economy over a decade of 
sustained growth in the 1990s played little or no role in the decline in rates of 
offending, compared to other more specific variables during that period, notably  
increases in police numbers, prisoner numbers, and  the control of crack-cocaine 
alongside the  legalisation of abortion. Most correlational studies lack this breadth of 
scope and depth of contextual analysis, and are thereby considerably limited in the 
deductions that they can safely make. On the basis of the research and evidence 
reviewed here, it is possible neither to dismiss a significant connection between 
economic conditions/unemployment rates and crime, nor to demonstrate a secure 
relationship, nor to assert demonstrable causal connections. 
 
Youth Crime and Unemployment 
 
Age differences can be expected to exert a significant influence on the 
unemployment-crime relation, because of the wide range of conditions under which 
young people experience unemployment. Specific studies of this relationship 
amongst young people aged 16 - 24 are, however, remarkably scarce, and with the 
exception of those noted above, are  almost exclusively concentrated on large-cohort 
aggregated data sets over time.  Dickinson (1995) , however, reports an 
(unreferenced) small scale qualitative study of 399 18-year-olds  dating from 1971-2. 
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Those who were unemployed were about three times as likely to offend. Property 
crime was more common. Dickinson also argues that young men in recessionary 
times are more likely than other groups to commit crimes when they are 
unemployed. It is nonetheless difficult to find clear data that demonstrates this. 
Carmichael and Ward’s (op.cit.) large scale aggregate data study in England and 
Wales found that youth unemployment is positively related to burglary, robbery and 
criminal damage rates, but observes ‘whether it is the unemployed themselves that 
are committing the crime is another question’ (p.570). The sole large-scale study of 
young people that makes any claims of a direct causal connection and concludes  
that ‘ youth unemployment has a positive and robust causal effect on most property 
crimes’ (Fougere et al., 2007, p.933, emphasis added).  
 
The statistical bifurcation of youth as an age category 
 
These three analyses strike a notable consensus on the strong positive correlation 
between acquisitive crime and unemployment amongst young people. But each 
takes a different view of the nature of the relationship identified. Dickinson 
conjectures a causal link, Fougere et al. claims to demonstrate such a link, while 
Carmichael and Ward are explicitly noncommittal not only on the issue of causality, 
and on the significance of the data at the level of actual individual cases. Together 
they provide a reasonable prima facie case in support of a significant association 
between unemployment and offending but they are far from conclusive. 
 
No detailed analytical study of a similar kind focussed on young people has been 
undertaken UK since the beginning of the 2008/9 financial crisis. Some of the recent 
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official statistical data is nevertheless indicative. The data from the YJB cited earlier 
(Figure Two) offers striking accounts of the reduction in crime over the past five 
years. The YJB’s most recent  report calculates that the 2010/11 figure  of PNC-
recorded numbers of young people in the youth justice system is a reduction of 19 
per cent since 2009/10 and a reduction of 46 per cent since 2006/07 (Youth Justice 
Board / Ministry of Justice (2012),p.19). But this is a limited approximation of the 
number of offences committed by young people.   
 
A more direct indicator  is the number of young people sentenced – although this too 
is restricted to reported crimes.  It is remarkable that, as Figure Five shows,  a 
steady state in numbers sentenced (c.90,000 to 100,000 per annum since 2000/01) 
began a series of sharp progressive falls coinciding with onset of the recession – 
from 78,000 in 2008/9 to 71,000 in 2010/11. This provides unequivocal evidence of a 
sharp decline in the number of offences coinciding with recession. 
  
[Figure 5 here] 
 
However, the disaggregated data shows some significant distinctions. Between 
2007/8 and 2010/11 all categories of proven offences showed reductions, but these 
reductions were sharply differentiated. Figure Six shows that the greatest reductions 
over this period were in motoring offences  (-56%), criminal damage (-48%) and 
breach of a statutory order (-39%).  The reductions in some forms of acquisitive 
crime were markedly less: robbery (-11%)  and burglary (-20%).  Amongst 
acquisitive crimes, only theft and handling stolen goods had declined more sharply (-
37%).  
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[Figure 6 HERE] 
Overall, then, the data is ambiguous. Amongst adults aged 18+ there are some 
indications that despite a marked continued fall in the number of offences, acquisitive 
crime rose during or after the recession, whilst a similar overall trend in reduced 
recorded offences amongst 10-17 year olds shows only some slow-down in the rate 
of comparable offences for some acquisitive crimes. The significance of this data is 
further complicated because it is based on two different methodologies. The adult 
data is based on CSEW reportage which is prone to errors of sampling and 
respondent recall, but has the benefit of recording a  high proportion of unreported 
(and unprosecuted) crimes. The data on young people captures only proven 
offences. The former source is equally likely to overestimate or underestimate the 
actual number of offences, for a variety of reasons (see Muncie, 2001); the latter is 
certain to underestimate actually occurring offences. 
 
The statistical invisibility of offending amongst 18-24 year olds 
 
Rates of offending amongst 10 to 17-year-olds have continued to decline less 
sharply than first appeared, alongside increasing levels of youth unemployment. One 
explanation is that the age of peak offending has been delayed.  YJB data shows 
that Youth Offending Team (YOT) caseloads increase very markedly with age: YOTs 
work with more than twice as many 17 year olds as 14 year olds (YJB, 2012, Chart 
3.2). The peak age of offending is usually estimated at around 18 years (Flood-Page 
et al, 2000; Ministry of Justice, 2010), continuing the progressive rise in age-related 
rates from 14 to 17 years. Although Figure Seven shows that 17 is the age of peak 
offending, the rate of decline in offending by age cohort above that age is relatively 
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slow up to the age of 20, and the 21-24 age group still offends more than older 
groups. 
 
[Figure 7 here] 
 
A number of plausible interpretations of the emergence of the mooted delay in the 
age of peak offending make this an important line of enquiry. One would suggest that 
YJB tactics of preventative intervention have succeeded in containing, controlling or 
diverting offending within the 10 to 17-year-old age range. As a result, young people 
who desist or who avoid reoffending may experience the transition to the adult 
criminal justice system  at 18+ as a relaxation of the regime and so offend more than 
17-year-olds. 
A second interpretation similarly emphasises a number of intensive interventionist 
measures to minimise the numbers of 16-18 year olds who can be classified as 
unemployed  through extended compulsory schooling and other forms of post-16 
participation. While such measures fall far short of protecting this age-group from the 
depredations of worklessness they serve both to delegitimise claims of ill-effects, 
and to place considerable pressures on families and households to absorb such 
effects. 
 
A third interpretation is that the sequential removal of entitlement to benefits and 
allowances for almost all 16 to 18-year-olds between 1988 and 1996 (see Muncie, 
2009, pp.249-251) has imbued a sense of the inevitable dependency of this 
interstitial age-group in the minds of young people and their parents alike. This 
serves to normalise ‘self-selected’ economic inactivity in ways that ameliorate 
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resentment about the lack of jobs and other opportunities. Difficult as it is to 
demonstrate the presence and reach of such responses, some recent studies of the 
intra-familial effects of recession point to similar adaptations (see Henwood et al, 
2010; Thomson et al, 2010). 
 
None of the published data allows this line of enquiry to be pursued. Published 
CSEW and PRC data does not routinely differentiate 18-59 year olds by age. In 
effect, this means that the highest profile age-specific impacts of economic effects on 
offending rates amongst 18-24 year olds are concealed within the data for the 18-59 
age group. This major omission has particular significance for understanding 
offences by young people. In-depth independent  research  has shown shifting 
patterns of particular offence types that vary significantly by age. Soothill’s (2002) 
study of the 1953 birth cohort in England and Wales  shows  that more robberies, 
burglaries and thefts (including handling stolen goods) are committed by 16-20 year 
olds than by any of six age categories across the 16-40 years span. Indeed this age-
group is by far the most prolific in all three categories of offending. 
 
The absence of more recent corroborative analyses obscures important insights into 
the variable links between offending and unemployment. This has considerably more 
significant implications. There is clear evidence that the 18-24 age group 
experiences the first, the most extreme and the most long-lasting effects of 
recessions upon the conditions of labour markets. The cessation of recruitment of 
young people by employers as the first, easiest and least costly economy measure 
manifests itself in extreme rates of unemployment in their age group. This near-
universal phenomenon (see International Labour Organisation, 2010, 2011) often 
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results in youth unemployment rates at least double the adult rate. In the UK the 
peak count of 1.2 million unemployed 18-24 year olds is widely believed to 
substantially underestimate actual youth unemployment rates. In all, efforts to test 
the relationship between recession and offending amongst young people are 
hamstrung by lack of differentiated data.  
 
These observations might be taken to imply that the persistence of acquisitive crimes 
amongst under 18-year-olds shown in Figure Six is continued or exaggerated in 
contiguous age cohorts. This would also reflect the observed recent  increases in 
adult personal theft and ‘other household theft’ (against falling overall adult offending 
rates) noted above. Exceptional data derived from police records by the YJB (Figure 
Eight) shows an increase in the total number of people sentenced for indictable 
offences since the onset of the 2009 recession. However, consistent with the other 
data, the steady progressive reduction in the numbers of under-18-year-olds 
sentenced since 2007/8 is reflected here. But it is also notable that a marginal 
reduction in offending amongst 18-20 year-olds began at the same time.  
 
Although the age ranges covered in Figures Eight and Nine are not an exact match, 
the divergence of ascending unemployment rates alongside declining rates of 
offending is reinforced by two sets of data which straddle the 17/18 age divide. Thus, 
over the same ten-year period, these tables respectively show the steady decline in 
rates of offending at the same time as rates of unemployment and other non-
participation begin their ascent. In terms of absolute numbers, the totals of young 
people ‘not in employment, education or training’ (‘NEET') show a relatively regular 
trajectory of increase from 2001 to 2011. However, this occurs in the context of a 
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demographic decrease in the size of these age cohorts over this period such that, 
proportionally,  the numbers of young people who are NEET remains fairly steady for 
the first eight years of the decade, and then begins its exceptional rise in the third 
quarter of 2009.  
 
[Figure 8 here] 
 
[Figure 9 here] 
 
The current decline in offending in times of high unemployment apparently once 
again further undermines the ‘economic causes of crime’  thesis. On the other side of 
the argument the persistence of acquisitive crimes within an underlying downward 
trend of offending suggest that the thesis may remain defensible if sufficient 
differentiated data were available – most notably immediately above the 18+ cut-off 
line.  
 
The Youth Justice Board and reduced offending: cause and effect? 
 
One change in the conditions under which the apparent inversion of the relationship 
between unemployment and offending has occurred is that it followed the 
establishment of the YJB, albeit  several years later. The intensive, highly regulated 
modes of preventive intervention based on risk assessments managed through 
YOTs  might well account for the decline in youth offending. Not only did YJB 
strategies reach maturity  at the time of  a decline in the numbers of recorded 
offences from 2008/9 onwards: one key factor in the risk profiling calculus which 
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guides intervention is non-participation in employment, education and training. This 
approach targets the very young people whose lack of economically or educationally 
gainful activity may have led them to offend, and  provides a plausible basis for 
inferring a causal connection between YJB practices and reduced offending. 
 
The YJB's own self-assessment does not make any claim for credit for the change. 
Its assigned performance measures are benchmarked to reductions in first-time 
entrants to the criminal justice system, reoffending, and the use of custody. YJB was 
able to demonstrate reductions in all three (YJB/MoJ, 2012). However, none of these 
criteria have any necessary connection with an overall reduction in rates of 
offending. All could in principle  be the product of selective targeting and priorities 
alongside an overall increase in offending. Notably, the YJB itself makes no claims to 
have reduced offending (YJB/MoJ, 2012, p.16)] 
 
Certainly, there are many evaluations of the work of the YJB that would lend support 
to claims of its broad effectiveness and that of YOTs (Earle and Newburn, 2001,  
Earle et al. 2002; Burnett, 2004; Stephenson et al., 2007, 2011). Others have been 
considerably less confident of the association between interventions and reductions 
in crime (see for example Smith. R., 2003; Solomon and Garside, 2008;  Phoenix, 
2010;  Smith, D., 2010). The cautious balance struck by the House of Commons’ 
Public Accounts Committee’s (2011) report is perhaps the most measured and telling 
assessment of the effectiveness of the YJB. Its principal conclusion that the youth 
justice system has been successful in reducing the number of criminal offences over 
the last ten years is immediately qualified by querying whether these are genuine 
reductions in crime or displacements dealt with by non-criminal sanctions. The 
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Committee notes that YJB has ‘limited evidence of what interventions work’ 
(Recommendation 4) and that it ‘lacks sufficient knowledge of what interventions are 
being used by Youth Offending Teams and how well they are working’ 
(Recommendation 6). 
 
At this point it is important to recall two caveats. Firstly, overall rates of offending 
across the adult age range have also continued to decline since 2008, in part of the 
criminal justice system over which YJB has no jurisdiction. The supposedly counter-
dominant trend for the number of offences to fall as unemployment rises can 
therefore reasonably be assumed to have other causes which are independent of the 
YJB’s distinctive interventions.  Secondly, for 10-17 year olds the only official data is 
derived from police crime records, which are acknowledged by the Home Office to 
undercount the total number of crimes committed. The CSEW’s record of self-
reported crime by victims offsets this limitation, and as a result gives a considerably 
higher estimate of the overall incidence of crime. But its data cannot differentiate 
offences committed by 10-17 year olds from those of adults. The crime count for 
young people must therefore be assumed to underestimate the incidence of actual 
offences. 
 
It is clear that attempts to associate YJB practices with reduced offending in any 
direct causal way lack a sufficiently clear empirical foundation, and that data on the 
incidence of offences committed is an underestimate. It is not safe to attribute a 
perceived decline in youth offending to the work of the YJB.  
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Re-calibrating the calculus of  risk: the paradox of success 
 
Attributing reductions in offending to the YJB also leads towards an uncomfortable 
paradox. Unemployment and non-participation are prominent risk factors in the 
YJB’s risk assessment methodology.  What, then, would be their significance in 
circumstances in which risk-based preventive interventions had succeed in breaking 
the claimed connection between unemployment and the offending to which it gave 
rise?  If aggregate levels of association between unemployment and offending had 
been demonstrably weakened by the YJB’s practices,  what would be the rationale 
for retaining unemployment as a factor in the case-specific calculus  of risk of 
offending? Revised models would surely have been needed that demoted or 
excluded unemployment as a risk factor. If the current pattern of weakened 
association is sustained and the data concerning  types of crime  and  over-18s are 
resolved, it is clear that, whatever the causes of the change, the models too should 
change. 
This apparent  ‘paradox of success’ whereby targeted interventions might have 
helped render redundant the very risk calculus that guided their targeting suggests 
that risk assessments are as inherently limited in their capacities to adapt to the 
exigencies of volatile economic conditions as are other analyses of connections 
between unemployment and offending – whether causal or spurious. Put differently, 
the uncertainties highlighted in the foregoing analysis would surely no longer provide 
a credible basis for including unemployment as a factor in risk profiling. Its 
connection to offending in current times is at best highly tenuous, and at worst a way 
of legitimising the intrusive management of vulnerable and disadvantaged categories 
and classes of young people.  
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At this juncture it is salutary to recall that aggregate patterns of statistical association 
between unemployment and offending are insufficiently strong to support claims of 
causal connections; but that the claimed association may nevertheless be defensible 
if sufficient offence-specific and age-differentiated data were available. The 
uncomfortable tension between these two statements makes for a less-than-
compelling case to persist with a faltering if not  flawed mode of analysis. This 
constitutes something of a ‘parting of the ways’. The arguments rehearsed here 
come to a head in a stark and difficult choice: to refine and extend the calculus of 
risk and its associated policies and practice, or to find alternative explanations for 
and responses to the apparently shifting relationship between unemployment and 
offending in times of major socio-economic change. 
 
Social cohesion and the delayed effects of unemployment 
 
One prospectively crucial alternative explanation counsels caution in assuming that 
the unemployment-crime nexus has changed significantly. Just as unemployment is 
a well-established 'lagging indicator' of economic recession, so also some of the 
most adverse manifestations of the effects of unemployment show a relatively 
systematic delay. There is an extensive literature on a range of so-called 'scarring' 
effects of unemployment on young people too large to cite here in detail. While it is 
not consensual, some significant tendencies are evident. For econometricians, 
periods of unemployment in youth have quite reliably strong adverse long-term 
effects on earning power (see Bell and Blanchflower, op.cit. for an overview). Social-
psychological studies reliably demonstrate reduced self-esteem, self-confidence and 
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sociality (e.g. Jahoda,1979; Goldsmith et al.,1997). Other contextual and individual 
psychological variables associate unemployment with depression and suicidal 
tendencies (Pritchard, 1992; Hagquist, 1998). More broadly-based sociological 
studies tend to associate unemployment with manifestations of social exclusion and 
alienation. 
 
Many of the relevant effects are indeterminate, discernible only through  attitudes, 
dispositions, degrees of withdrawal and so-called 'disengagement' that make claims 
of delayed effects difficult to substantiate. Suicide and attempted suicide are among 
the few finite junctures against which delayed effects can be measured. And here, 
there is some general agreement that, in young men in particular, this extreme 
outcome is mostly likely to occur between one and two years after the onset of 
unemployment (Pritchard, op.cit.; Hagquist, op.cit.). 
 
The international rise of social unrest  
 
Far more important than the delay interval is the clear evidence that, at the level of 
the individual, it takes time for the damage of inactivity and exclusion from labour 
markets and other modes of productive activity to be realised. It would therefore be 
unremarkable if the time-lag between the individualised experience of being 
unemployed and a public and/or collectivised expression of frustration or anger at 
this condition was commensurately longer. The evidence from the Mediterranean 
countries that experienced major youth protests in 2011 and subsequently supports 
this hypothesis. In most of North Africa and in Greece and Spain extraordinarily high 
levels of youth unemployment have long been endemic (ILO, 2010), but the 
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emerging effects of global recession in combination with country-specific factors 
prompted mass collective protest in 2011.  
 
Unsurprisingly, the significance of these often quite extreme collective responses on 
the part of young people has been widely observed. It has raised sufficient anxiety 
about its social and economic consequences to prompt a strikingly diverse range of 
Inter-Governmental Organisations (IGOs) to respond. It is a mark of the levels of 
international concern about the now-globalising problem of youth unemployment that 
three IGOs as diverse as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, the International Monetary Fund, and the International Labour 
Organisation have all issued guidance, cautionary comments and direct warnings to 
national governments about the social consequences of failure to address youth 
unemployment. 
 
In some instances, the responses constitute significant shifts in position. Until 2010, 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), had been silent on youth unemployment. 
Remarkably, its first intervention on the subject focussed concluded that […] ‘the 
labour market experience of today‘s youth will have deep adverse impacts on the 
faith in public institutions of future generations. (IMF/ ILO, 2010, p.00). This is a 
surprising departure for an IGO concerned with economic not social  stability. Even 
more striking is the shift of position at the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD). Until the global financial crises and the sharp rise in 
youth unemployment, the OECD's position had been heavily invested in its 
predominant strongly neo-liberal stance and its assertively anti-welfarist position (see 
McBride, 2011). By 2011, its main annual employment report commented: 
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Investing in youth and giving them a better start in the world of work should be 
a key policy objective. Otherwise, there is a high risk of persistence or growth 
in the hard-core group of youth who are left behind, facing poor employment 
and earnings prospects. In a context of ageing populations, OECD economies 
and societies simply cannot afford the large economic and social costs that 
such an outcome would entail.(OECD,  2011, p.00) 
 
Awareness of the social implications is particularly significant here, sufficient to 
prompt the OECD Directorate to urge member nations to target intensive assistance, 
to make temporary extensions to the safety net as ‘vital to prevent poverty’, and to 
provide income support, and effective, reliable social protection (Martin / OECD, 
2011, p.13). 
 
The International Labour Organisation’s (ILO’s) attention to social unrest and its 
implicit connections with crime take the debate a significant step further. One report 
(ILO, 2012a) envisages an explicit causal link: 
 
Unemployment breeds social exclusion that, in turn, gives rise to high welfare 
dependence, crime and anti-social behaviour… (Paragraph 22) 
 
The depth and breadth of the current youth employment crisis, and the social 
unrest that is unfolding, underscore how much is at stake in international and 
national efforts to avert a second and potentially more dangerous phase of the 
global crisis… (Paragraph 24) 
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These powerful statements are founded in substantial research undertaken by the 
ILO's Institute for International Labour Studies. Its annual report (IILS, 2011) shows 
that social unrest is increasing worldwide especially in the advanced economies. 
Globally, unemployment is the largest and most significant determinant of risk of 
unrest (see Figure 1.12). Other studies support an historical association between 
poor job prospects amongst young, educated people  and public protests (Jenkins 
and Wallace, 1996), and between austerity measures and social protests (Ponticelli 
and Voth (2011). Recent evidence from southern Europe and North Africa powerfully 
supports this thesis (Jawad, R., 2012; LaGraffe, D., 2012; Papoudopolos, T. and 
Roumpakis, A. 2012; Ramos-Diaz, J.  and Varela, A., 2012) 
 
A number of recent speeches by the Director General of the ILO have underscored 
this connection. At the Davos Summit he drew on unreferenced data that had 
counted more than a thousand cities across 82 countries that had experienced youth 
protests during 2011 (Somavia, 2012a). Subsequently, he applauded what he 
described as ' a powerful reassertion of activism from young people who refuse to 
accept a future of unemployment, marginal work and expensive, poor quality 
education’ (Somavia, 2012b, p.00); and supported this by stating his belief that ‘there 
is a growing conviction of the need to change course stimulated by social 
movements and protests in many countries, themselves fuelled by the growth of 
inequality and intolerable levels of youth unemployment’ (Somavia, 2012c, p.00). 
 
In the same year the ILO’s crisis report on youth unemployment, Time for Action, 
concluded: 
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The situation of youth employment thus deserves urgent attention. Not only does 
it threaten to violate the principle of equality and solidarity between generations, 
which is an important aspect of social justice, but any further prolonging or 
deepening of the crisis will also increase the likelihood of political and social 
unrest as more and more young people lose faith in the current economic 
paradigm. (ILO, 2012a, p.00)  
 
This is a stark warning of the potential consequences of inaction. In case the ILO’s 
words be thought alarmist and exaggerated, many commentators would agree that 
faltering faith in the current economic paradigm motivated many during the uprisings 
of the Arab spring, in which the key role of young people and the prominence of 
unemployment and an endemic absence of economic opportunities have been 
identified as important ingredients (Jaward, 2012; Weddady and Ahmari (eds.) 
2012). The increase in some key indicators of social unrest (including poor 
confidence in government and high unemployment) has been as great in the 
'advanced economies'. The responses of young people in Greece and Spain offer an 
alarming insight into the ways in which weakening confidence in an economic 
paradigm begin to manifest themselves as the beginnings of classic crises of 
legitimacy. In a prescient speech to the prestigious Brookings Institution two years 
earlier the ILO Director-General was warning that:  
 
The crisis has again put before our eyes something that we all know: good 
jobs, quality jobs, decent work are, everywhere, central to the lives of women 
and men. Decent work is a source of personal dignity. Stability of family and 
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households. Peace in the community. Trust in government and business and 
overall credibility of the institutions that govern our societies.  
(Somavia, 2010, p.00) 
 
Unemployment, crime and social cohesion 
 
Importantly, what connects these commentaries from leading IGOs is an emerging 
focus on threats to political legitimacy and social cohesion posed by the exclusion of 
young people from labour markets and wider social and economic participation. 
Indeed, the most thorough, evidenced recent analysis of social cohesion in this 
context that is available comes from the World Bank. It dedicated a significant strand 
of its World Development Report 2013 to the subject (World Bank, 2012). The 
chapter on jobs and social cohesion states: 
 
…cross country analysis of values surveys finds that job 
loss or lack of access to jobs is associated with lower levels of trust and civic 
engagement. …In extreme cases, if people, particularly youth, lack jobs and 
hope for the future, they may turn to violent or criminal activity to compensate 
for the absence of self-esteem and sense of belonging that a job might 
otherwise provide.(p.126) 
 
The text is concerned with the correlates of unemployment and a range of attributes 
and dispositions of people who are unemployed, focussing on social trust, 
community and political particiapiton. But the explicit conception of social cohesion is 
grounded in social-psychological categories and individual behaviours. As such it 
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lacks a fully social – or economic – conception of cohesion that takes into account 
structural factors. By comparison, Green et al's (2009) comprehensive study is 
commendable. It is a major comparative modelling project across [n] countries using 
a typology of ‘regimes of social cohesion’ acknowledged to be heavily derived from 
the work of Esping-Andersen (1999). For all the limitations of this approach, it 
provides some well-analysed indicators. One of the assigned indices of social 
cohesion is the level of state management of labour markets and employment 
protection alongside levels of income inequality. Unremarkably, this marker finds the 
Social Democratic Nordic countries and to a lesser extent the Social Market 
countries of most of the rest of Europe to have high levels of institutionally 
embedded state-driven social cohesion. Characterised as a Liberal regime, in 
contrast, Great Britain (the analysis excludes data for Northern Ireland) exhibits 
lower levels of social cohesion on this indicator: less employment protection and 
greater income inequality, but also compensatingly higher levels of civic 
participation, also taken to be indicative of a more socially cohesive societies. More 
significantly for this discussion, across the board, greater extremes of income 
inequality are found to be closely associated with higher levels of violent crime, and 
taken together these are presented as significant markers of weak social cohesion. 
This is the profile that characterises Great, in greatest contrast to Social Democratic 
regimes where incomes are considerably less unequal and violent crime rates 
significantly lower.  
 
Positivist high-volume, high-aggregation studies like those of Green et al and the 
World Bank are open to the same methodological criticisms that applied to risk 
analyses and studies based on inferential statistical association considered earlier in 
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this paper. And many other definitions,  indices and interpretations of social cohesion 
are available. Nevertheless, their sheer international scale, the robust strengths of 
the associations they report, and their contextualising differentiation of regime types 
carry some weight. Many of their findings are echoed in different ways in more 
nuanced, qualitative analyses that associate exclusion from labour markets with 
tendencies towards lower levels of social and economic integration of a kind that 
evidence the ‘scarring' effects of unemployment (for example Hannan,1998; 
MacDonald et al., op.cit; Webster et al., op.cit.) 
 
The sharp distinctions which Green et al’s study identifies between Great Britain’s 
model of social cohesion, and that of most of the rest of Europe inevitably prompts 
speculation about the different ways in which young people have responded to mass 
unemployment  across all three social cohesion regime types. In the Social 
Democratic Nordic countries, street protest by young people about unemployment  
has been minimal and overall crime rates remain low. In the Social Market countries 
of Mediterranean Europe where public protests have been most frequent and 
voluble, overall violent crime rates are amongst the lowest in Europe, but income 
inequality is much greater than in the Social Democratic countries. And in Great 
Britain, violent crime is the second highest of all the countries analysed, far in excess 
of other European countries, but income inequality is broadly the same as that for 
the Mediterranean Social Market regimes. These observations make a strong prima 
facie case that the youth crime and unemployment link is weakest in the Nordic 
Social Democratic countries, and strongest in Liberal Great Britain. In the Nordic 
countries this profile is associated with minimal protest, in the Mediterranean 
countries with recurrent and mostly peaceful protest that directly articulates 
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objections to the economic injustices of unemployment and inequality; in England 
with a single explosive episode of violent rioting in August 2011 involving extensive 
criminal damage, which was not directly articulated with a specified unified set of 
injustices.  
 
It would be rash to draw conclusions from these observations without thorough 
assessment of the age-specific incidence of crime, inequality and unemployment in 
these countries, and without a comprehensive review of the forms of protest and 
other mass reactions. But even from this brief overview it is clear that the concept of 
social cohesion should be  axial to any analysis that purports to explain increased 
levels of crime or mass protest  in relation to endemic unemployment. But the 
insights which a full analysis could be expected to bring forward are capable of 
providing an entirely different interpretation of the inversion of the historical patterns 
of association between unemployment and offending. On this reading, social protest 
is a manifestation of delayed effects of extended unemployment which, as some 
IGOs have begun to infer, result from weakening social bonds and diluted social 
solidarity. Whether protest is an alternative to crime – and thus in some contexts 
might explain the weakening link between unemployment and offending – or whether 
it takes criminal forms that re-configure that link is far from clear. Either way, delayed 
protest or delayed offending as responses to being unemployed may mean that the 
full effects of mass youth unemployment have yet to manifest themselves. 
 
Once again, this line of interpretation leads to a prospective methodological ‘parting 
of the ways’. One response is to persist with the apparently fast-diminishing returns 
from aetiologically-inspired cohort studies that aim to ‘see inside’ the points of 
 29 
articulation between unemployment and offending – or make better calculations of 
the determinants of weakening social cohesion. Alternatively, this may be a critical 
moment at which to consider some of the fundamental principles of social and 
economic organisation that underpin social cohesion. Here, the words of the ILO 
report quoted earlier, that the principle of equality and solidarity between generations 
is an important aspect of social justice,  seem particularly pertinent to an analysis 
that is cognisant of the centrality of social cohesion to this debate.  
Responsibilities and the principle of the right to work 
 
In the multiple layers of policy revision and re-steering of the youth justice system in 
England and Wales over more than six decades, it is easy to lose sight of the 
principles which should inform every system of youth justice, especially if it is also 
committed to securing social justice. Goldson and Muncie (2006) outline a 'critical 
anatomy' of such principles. They take the International Human Rights Framework 
(IHRF) as providing the founding precepts for any such system , to argue that:  
 
Ethically legitimate, rights-compliant and effective approaches to youth crime 
and justice must be located within a broad corpus of social and economic 
policy rather than the narrower confines of youth/criminal justice policy (p.222, 
emphasis in original). 
 
There could be no better illustration of the importance and relevance of this assertion 
than the preceding discussion. The current socio-economic context fundamentally 
conditions the operating circumstances of the youth justice system of the UK. 
Understanding this policy context is essential for ensuring an appropriate alignment 
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between social justice and criminal justice of a kind that has special significance for 
responding to norm infraction amongst young people. Of fundamental relevance to a 
system of youth justice that is located within its social and economic policy context  
are young people's rights in labour markets. One such right concerns the protection 
of children up to the age of 18 from economic exploitation (Article 32 of the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989). The first clause of Article 23 of 
the UN Declaration of Human Rights reads: 
Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and 
favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment. 
Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration 
ensuring for himself and his [sic] family an existence worthy of human 
dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social 
protection. 
For that overwhelming majority of young people who have nothing to sell but their 
labour, the failure of the basic universal chartered rights to employment, to the free 
choice of employment, to freedom from economic exploitation, and to just and 
favourable remuneration between the ages of 16 and 24 is clear.  
 
Responsibilities, rights and ‘mutual obligations’ 
 
It is highly significant that one of the most penetrating discourses of recent times 
straddles the fields of welfare / unemployment policies, and criminal justice policies. 
New Labour's insistence that rights carry responsibilities has a distinctively multi-
valent capacity to cross these policy fields. Young people in particular are enjoined 
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to take responsibility for their own actions or accept the consequences of not doing 
so. In the context of labour markets, this entails accepting participation in work 
programmes in lieu of contracts of employment when no work is available. In welfare 
and social protection policy, it entails readiness to work. And in youth criminal justice 
policy it entails meeting conditions of conduct, participation in behaviour 
management and other programmes, and observing restrictions on movement and 
association in lieu of custodial or other sentences. It is thus against the responsibility 
to meet prescribed norms of participation and conduct that rights to employment or 
to social protection are to be honoured. 
 
This 'mutual obligations' discourse has always implied a balance between the inputs 
through which responsibilities are discharged, and the outputs each individual claims 
'by rights'. Its credibility depends on the commensurate nature of inputs and outputs. 
It was achieved in the highly conducive conditions of the longest boom of the post-
war era. It made the underlying bargain of maintaining tolerable minimum living 
standards in exchange for actual jobs or simulated work sustainable .  
 
This publically-sanctioned 'mutual obligations' approach was one of the 
transformative features of New Labour’s consolidatory normalisation of neoliberal 
market economics and neoliberal social governance (see Heron and Dwyer, 1999). 
Their faltering and contested introduction under previous Conservative governments 
gave way to the infinitely more effective managerialised and governmentalised 
structures and processes of New Labour's centralist forms of governing see for 
example (Clarke et al., eds.,1994). As the thresholds of young people's increasingly 
conditionalised entitlement to unemployment benefit, housing benefits, 
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supplementary benefits and other now-defunct means of financial support were 
raised, young people’s tolerance for the 'rights/responsibilities' bargain was 
maintained by generally buoyant youth labour markets. 
 
The conditions of this bargain begun to falter with the onset of the 2008/9 recession. 
With the election of the coalition government in 2010, the political-economic context 
shifted much more significantly. The removal of the safety valve of buoyant labour 
markets began to throw into much sharper relief incommensurate rights ‘outputs’  in 
return for responsible ‘inputs’ – and the eroded mutuality that this implies.  The 
absence of sufficient employment opportunities are the essence of the emerging 
disjuncture. In addition, unreasonable pressures upon young people to accept places 
on programmes which provide no skills or development, to work without pay and to 
accept levels of weekly remuneration that could not sustain independent living for a 
day grossly exaggerate reasonable expectations of responsible participation. An 
emergent discourse of ‘disengagement’ attributes failure to compete in labour 
markets to unwillingness to gain qualifications and accumulate skills in 
circumstances in which it is beyond question that the failure to gain employment is 
the result of demand failure in a large majority of local labour markets.  
 
Such conditions so powerfully exaggerate individual responsibility for worklessness 
as to risk destruction-testing the credibility of the mutual obligations discourse. The 
palpable erosion of the rights to work, to free choice of employment and to just and 
favourable conditions and remuneration now threatens the legitimacy of the "rights 
and responsibilities" discourse. This, it is crucial to remember, is the discourse which 
became the axis of settlement which disabled and mollified protest and resistance in 
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the 20-year transition from Social Democratic to Neoliberal market and welfare 
conditions in the UK.  
 
Concluding comments 
 
Across the piece, quantitative analysis has demonstrated weak predictive and 
explanatory powers and a poor capacity to account for atypical trends in rates of 
unemployment and the incidence of offending amongst young people in the UK.  
Despite this, the same correlational, inferential and actuarial statistical techniques as 
have been used in such studies continue to provide the core models for the methods 
of risk profiling which have shaped the dominant approach of youth justice practice in 
England and Wales for the past 15 years. Some puzzling paradoxical and potentially 
contradictory issues arise. As we have noted, it is unclear why techniques that have 
had such a limited success in identifying  a significant relationship between 
unemployment and offending are deemed adequate contributors to the processes of 
risk profiling which determine who will be the object of intensive surveillance and 
intervention in the current practices of youth justice.  
 
Rather than revise the parameters for the correction and refinement of techniques 
that have, at best, been only partially successful, other explanations for the counter-
typical divergent trend of unemployment and offending can lay strong claim to being 
afforded new levels of priority for research and policy alike. One approach briefly 
outlined here is to consider the evidence that the unique characteristics of the 
present recessions may have the effect of delaying responses on the part of young 
people. In the absence of clear and reliable evidence, events beyond the UK have 
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highlighted the very real possibilities that responses to unemployment can take quite 
different forms. Modes of social unrest and manifestations of extreme discontent 
abroad already have partial parallels with the English Riots of 2010. Once again, the 
reflex response of research and policy analysis leans towards the proto-aetiological, 
focusing on efforts to profile the characteristics and circumstances of rioters and 
establish parameters of causality (e.g. National Centre for Social Research, 2011). 
However, the surprisingly congruent responses of four powerful IGOs  have drawn 
attention to the threats to social cohesion posed by extremes of extended or 
endemic levels of youth unemployment – in one case to issue stern warnings of the 
risks of radicalisation and loss of confidence in the dominant economic paradigm. By 
raising serious questions about the continued credibility of the 'mutual obligations' 
and 'rights and responsibilities' approaches as imbalances intensify between what is 
provided for and what is demanded of young people in increasingly adverse 
conditions, this paper has emphasised the priorities and principles that underpin 
fundamental human rights that should surely frame all systems of youth justice. 
 
Translating such rights into workable practicable youth justice policies deserves 
serious consideration of a kind that it has not received for many decades. There has 
been a resurgence of rights-based initiatives – for example the  Decent Work 
Initiative and the Global Social Protection Floor spearheaded by UN agencies. These 
merit careful exploration and costing on premises that have considerably higher 
aspirations than the minimalistic, disciplinary and exploitative modes of job creation 
and diversion from labour markets that currently characterise provision for young 
people without work. An essential part of such calculations would be more 
thoroughgoing research into the crime reduction effects of such measures than have 
 35 
currently been available. The benefits to social cohesion, to remaking a flawed 
economic paradigm and to the reassertion of chartered human rights are potentially 
great indeed. Some substantial diversion of research and policy endeavour away 
from modelling and aetiological approaches that have poor and unproven returns, 
and towards lines of enquiry that include an appropriate recognition of the human 
and social as well as economic costs of unrest and weakening social cohesion has 
rarely been more warranted in modern times. 
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